1 1 with probability and continues with probability . At Y, again, it exits 2 2 1 1 with probability and continues with probability . The passenger has no 2 2 control over the automobile. Moreover, he cannot distinguish between intersections X and Y and cannot remember whether he has already gone through one of them. At START, the passenger's probability for arriving at C is . At X, it is 4 1 . But in moving from START to X, the passenger has received no signal, 3 no new information. At START, he knew with probability 1ᎏindeed, with absolute certaintyᎏthat he will arrive at X. How, then, can his probability change? But it does! The apparent paradox can be cast in decision-theoretic terms as follows: Ž . At each node START, X, and Y , the passenger is offered, for $30, a lottery ticket that yields $100 if C is reached, and $0 otherwise. The ticket 1 yields an expected loss of $5 at START and an expected gain of $3 at X.
3
Assuming linear utilities, therefore, he would refuse at START and accept at X; and this even though he gets from START to X with certainty. *This note grew out of a question raised by the Associate Editor in charge of our paper w x ''The Absent-Minded Driver'' 1997 . Research partially supported by grants of the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and the Game Theory Program at SUNY᎐Stony Brook.
† E-mail: ratio@vms.huji.ac.il.
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At X, he knows he is at X or Y, and his probability p for being at X is twice his X Ž probability p for being at Y since he goes through X with probability 1, and through Y How can this be? In particular, since he knows at START that he will get to X, and that he will buy there, why shouldn't he buy at START? The reader may want to stop here and try to figure it out.
The answer is simple. The two intersections, X and Y, are indistinguishable. When the passenger buys a lottery ticket at X, he does not know that he is at X. As far as he knows, he may be at Yᎏin which case the lottery is favorable. In contrast, ''being at START'' is like ''being at X for sure''ᎏand the lottery is unfavorable there.
To clarify this further, consider the overall payoff expected from the Ž decision ''at an intersection, buy a ticket.'' Recall that the two intersections are indistinguishable, and thus a ticket will be bought at each 1 . intersection through which the car goes. With probability , the passenger 2 1
will end up at A, with one ticket and no prize; with probability , he will 4 1 end up at B, with two tickets and no prize; with probability , he will end is positive! What happens is that at Y, the lottery ticket is ''good''; at Xᎏwhich is the same as at STARTᎏit is ''bad.'' In balance, it turns out to be good. 2, 3 Note that this change in behavior has nothing to do with the ''absent-Ž . minded driver' ' Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997 . The issue there is to Ž . compare what one plans at START to do at the intersections with what one does at the intersections. As pointed out in Aumann, Hart, and Perry Ž . 1997 , the decision that is optimal there at the planning stage is also optimal at the action stage. This is a general phenomenon. In particular, it holds for the passenger in the current example: the planning optimal decision is to buy a lottery ticket at each intersection, and this is also the action optimal decision. 
